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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of tlte Case 
This is an appeal from the denial of an I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
On November 8, 2001, Christopher Griffith was charged with committing first-degree 
murder by aggravated battery. R 18. He was found guilty by ajury. R 14. The district court 
imposed a life sentence with 22 years fixed. R 14. A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. R 16. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Further, in affirming the fixed term portion 
of the sentence, the Court wrote that "Idaho Code § 18-4004 requires a life sentence with a 
minimum determinate term often years upon a conviction for first degree murder. Under the 
circumstances of this case, the beating death of a two-year-old child, the sentence is not 
excessive." State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 370, 161 P.3d 675, 689 (Ct. App. 2007) (review 
denied). 
On February 3, 2014, Mr. Griffith filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence Under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35. R 20. As will be set out in detail below, he argued that the twenty-two year 
fixed term was illegal because I.C. § 18-4004 requires the sentencing court to impose a fixed 
term sentence of at least but no more than ten years. R 21-29. 
The district court denied the motion holding as follows: 
According to the statute, the sentencing court has the statutory authority to 
impose, on a defendant found guilty of murder, a determinate sentence up to life 
in prison. The statute only restricts the court from imposing a determinate 
sentence of less than ten years. In other words, the statutes [sic] sets a base line 
for the fixed minimum giving the court discretion to set a fixed portion of a 
sentence at the minimum of 10 years up to life. The plain language of the statute 
requires that the mandatory minimum penalty of imprisonment must not be less 
than 10 years. The statute certainly does not mandate that the fixed portion of the 
sentence be set at 10 years. Griffith's determinate sentence of22 years is 
consistent with the Idaho Code section 19-2513 and Idaho Code section 18-4004. 
R 37-39. 
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. R 42. 
III. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Do I.C. §§ 18-4004 and 19-2513, when read in para materia, require the sentencing court 
to impose a fixed term of precisely ten years? 1 
IV. ARGUMENT 
As explained in the district court, I.C. §§ 18-4004 and 19-2513 required the sentencing 
court to impose a ten-year fixed term. Consequently, the twenty-two year fixed term is an illegal 
sentence. 
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation. This Court exercises free review 
over the interpretation of statutes. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 17 6, 177, 267 P .3d 1291, 1292 
(Ct. App. 2011). In 2001, when the offense was committed, Idaho Code§ 18-4004 provided, in 
relevant part, that: 
[W]henever the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment, the court shall 
set forth in its judgment and sentence a minimum period of confinement of not 
less than ten (1 0) years during which period of confinement the offender shall not 
be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good 
conduct, except for meritorious service. 
The Unified Sentencing Act, LC. § 19-2513, states, in relevant part, as follows: 
1 A similar issue was raised but rejected by the Court of Appeals in State v. Nicolai, (No. 
41566) 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 509 (May 16, 2014), petition for review denied (June 20, 
2014). This issue is also being raised in State v. S]Jarks, No. 41979. 
2 
If the offense carries a mandatory minimum penalty as provided by statute, the 
court shall specify a minimum period of confinement consistent with such statute. 
The Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of these two statutes, albeit in a different 
context, in State v. Paul, 118 Idaho 717, 718-19, 800 P.2d 113, 114-15 (Ct. App. 1990). The 
Paul Court wrote: 
In interpreting the meaning of these two statutes, we are mindful of the principal 
rule governing statutory interpretation. "Statutes must be interpreted to mean 
what the legislature intended for the statute to mean." In re Miller, 110 Idaho 
298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986), quoting Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 
615,618,661 P.2d 1214, 1217 (1983). In addition, statutes which are in pari 
materia are to be construed together, so as to further the legislative intent. State v. 
Creech, 105 Idaho 362,670 P.2d 463 (1983). Where, as here, both statutes deal 
with the same subject matter, sentencing, the statutes are in pari materia. 
Therefore, I. C. § 18-4004 must be construed harmoniously, if at all possible, with 
I.C. § 19-2513. 
!d. Further, the Supreme Court has written that "[t]he word shall when used in a statute, is 
mandatory." Goffv. HJH Co., 95 Idaho 837, 839, 521 P.2d 661, 663 (1974). The courts do not 
have the authority to revise an unambiguous statute on the grounds that it is patently absurd or 
that it would produce absurd results as written. Ravencroft v. Boise County, 154 Idaho 613,616, 
301 P.3d 271, 274 (2013). 
Applying those rules of construction, this Court should conclude that the statutes when 
read together mean that the sentencing court "shall" impose a fixed term of confinement that is 
"consistent" with a mandatory minimum term required by § 18-4004, i.e., a fixed term of 
precisely ten years. 
This conclusion is supported by the analysis found in State v. Paul, supra. There, the 
defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and argued that under I. C. 18-4004 and the 
Unified Sentencing Act, the sentence court could not impose a fixed term of confinement. While 
it is no surprise that the Court of Appeals rejected that argument, it made some observations 
pertinent to this case: 
Idaho Code§§ 18-4004 and 19-2513 were amended in 1986 through passage of 
House Bill 524, entitled the "Unified Sentencing Act of 1986." The purpose of 
this Act was to implement a unified system of sentencing which allows judges to 
impose a sentence containing both a "fixed" component and an "indeterminate" 
component, requiring, however, that the judge must state what the minimum 
period of incarceration shall be. The statement of purpose accompanying H.B. 
524 explained: 
Under the unified sentence, the judge imposes a minimum sentence 
term which must be served and cannot be reduced by commutation, 
parole or good-time but can be reduced for meritorious service 
plus, at the court's discretion, an indeterminate sentence to begin at 
the completion of the minimum term. Under this proposal, a court 
can impose a purely fixed sentence but cannot impose a purely 
indeterminate sentence. [Emphasis added.] 
The ... [proposed legislation] removes all minimum parole 
requirements in Section 20--223, Idaho Code. This is intended to 
render Section 20-223 consistent with the policy being 
implemented by unified sentencing, namely, placing the discretion 
of setting minimum sentences into the hands of the judge. The 
change to Section 20-223 requires new language in Section 18-
4004 to require persons serving a sentence for first-degree murder 
serve [a} minimum of 10 years. [Emphasis added.] 
Statement of Purpose, H.B. 524 (1986)2 
Under the former provisions of§ 20-223, a person given a life sentence was not 
eligible for parole until the person had served at least ten years. Obviously, the 
legislature wanted to retain this minimum period of incarceration for first-degree 
murder sentences. At the same time, the Unified Sentencing act reflects a 
willingness on the part of the legislature to allow the sentencing judge to set the 
mandatory minimum in most other cases, including second degree murder. Thus, 
we conclude that the real exception which the legislature intended in the Unified 
Sentencing Act was for the sentence of first degree murder- not for second 
A copy of House Bill 524 is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
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degree murder. 
State v. Paul, 118 Idaho at 718-19, 800 P.2d at 114-115 (all emphasis and brackets in original). 
Thus, under the analysis of Paul, the Sentencing Reform Act gave the sentencing court 
the power to set fixed terms, with the exception of first-degree murder where it intended to retain 
the existing rule of parole eligibility after ten years. In this case, however, the court did not 
follow the mandatory language of I. C. § 19-2513, but instead imposed a term of 22 years fixed, 
more than double the ten-year sentence required by I. C. § 18-4004. Consequently, the fixed term 
here is illegal. 
This is not only a matter of statutory interpretation of a state law, but also of federal due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 345, 100 
S.Ct. 2227, 2229 (1979) (The deprivation of a state statutory right to be sentenced by a jury was 
also a violation of federal due process as "[t]he defendant in such a case has a substantial and 
legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the 
jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion and that liberty interest is one that the Fourteenth 
Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by the State."); see also, Fetterly v. Paskett, 
997 F.2d 1295, 1300 (91h Cir. 1993) ("[T]he failure of a state to abide by its own statutory 
commands may implicate a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against 
arbitrary deprivation by a state."); and Ballardv. Estelle, 937 F.2d 453,456 (91h Cir. 1991). 
Here, the failure of the sentencing court to follow the statutory scheme also violated Mr. 
Griffith's fight to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It is respectfully requested that this Court find that the only legal fixed sentence that can 
be imposed here is ten years, per§ 18-4004 and § 19-2513. 
5 
V. CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in denying the Rule 35 motion. This Court should reverse that 
order and remand to the district court with instructions to impose a fixed sentence of precisely 
ten years. 
Respectfully submitted this~~~ of July, 2014. 
D..e,v.~~~~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Christopher Griffith 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on July ::(, 2014, I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing 




to: Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 























Fo.rty-eighth Legislature Second Regular Session - 1986 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE lHLL NO. 
BY JUDICIARY, RULES AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
1-..N ACT 
RELATING TO CRIMINAL SENTENCING; PROVIDING A SHORT TITLE; AMENDING. SECTION 
18-4004, IDAHO CODE, TO REQUIRE A MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE OF TEN YEARS 
BE SERVED IF A SENTENCE FOR LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS IMPOSED AND TO DENY 
ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR DISCHARGE OR OTHER REDUCTION OF SENTENCE DURING 
THE MINIMUM TERM; AMENDING SECTION 19-2513, IDAHO CODE, TO AUTHORIZE A 
COURT TO IMPOSE A UNIFIED SENTENCE CONTAINING A MINIMUM SENTENCE FOLLOWED, 
IN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT, BY AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE, TO DENY 
ELIGI3ILI'IT FOR P.;.~OLE CR. DISSH.A .. ~GE O~(O~iffi~4,:iEriu·cTIO!'l Ot? SE~~TE}!CE~':r EXCEPT 
:V:-V,"ntr.:. ;,,, :"',·-~-·-· · · · ~ 
FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE, DURING THE MINIMUM TERM, TO REQUIRE UNIFIED ·sEN-
TENCES BE CONSISTENT WITH STATUTORY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES IF APPLI-
CABLE, TO REQUIRE THE COURT TO IMPOSE A MINIMUM TERM PURSUANT TO A SEN-
TENCE ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IF REQUIRED BY STATUTE, IF APPLICABLE, TO 
REQUIRE ALL MINIMUM TERMS BE SERVED BEFORE INDETERMINATE TERMS COMMENCE 
AND TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE DATE; REPEALING SECTION 19-2513A, IDAHO CODE; 
AND AMENDING SECTION 20-223, IDAHO CODE, TO REMOVE MINIMUM ELIGIBILITY 
REQUIREMENTS FOR PAROLE AND TO ALLOW PAROLE ONLY WHEN THE COMMISSION OF 
PARDONS AND PAROLE REASONABLY BELIEVES THAT THE PRISONER DOES NOT CONSTI-
TUTE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF SOCIETY; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. ~t 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
~SECTION·!. This act shall be kno'.l!l as the "Unified Sentencing Act of 
1986.;;- ·"-:,--:~·.~·. 
23 SECTION 2. ThaE Section 18-4004, Idaho Code, be, and the same 1s hereby 
24 amended to read as follows: 
25 18-4004. PUNISHMENT FOR MURDER. Subject to Lhe provisions of 19~2515, 
26 Idaho Code, every person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be ~un-
27 1snea oy dzach or by impri-;onmer.:: fc-::- life, provided that when~"c:::__t_!Je couz-t 
28 shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment, the courL shall set forth in its 
29 judgment and sentence a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten 
30 (10) years during which period of confinement the offender shall not be eli-
31 gible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good con-
32 duct, except for meritorious service. Every person guilty of murder of the 
33 second degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and 
34 the imprisonment may extend to life. 
35 SECTION 3. That Section 19-2513, Idaho Code, be, and the same 1s hereby 
36 amended to read as follows: 
37 19-2513. fNBE7ERMfNArE UNIFIED SENTENCE. 7he-minimom-period-of--impri~on-
38 ment-in-the-penitentiary-heretofore-provided-by-raw-for-the-poni~hment-of-fer-
39 onie3,--and--each--~och-minimom-period-of-impri~onment-for-£eronie~,-hereby-i~ 
40 abori~hed• Whenever any person is convicted of having committed a felony, the 
41 court shall, unless it shall commute the sentence, suspend or withhold judg~ 
EXHl81T_A_ 28 
2 
1 ment and sentence or grant probation, as provided by chapter 26 of title 19, 
2 Idaho Code, or unless it shall impose the death sentence as provided by law, 









12 cri~e-:r--here~o~ore-:-committed. The court shall specify a Cmm"imum;?tteriod1}()f'ic·on.;.. 
13 i£iheme ;t:;-;na· s ecif a subse uent indeterminate erio'cf''"'"of Jrcii'st:'O'a' • The 
14 ~-court shall set forth in its judgment and sentence the minimum "'period of con-
15 finement and the subsequent indet~~minate period, if any, provided, that the 
16 aggregate sentence shall not exceed the maximum provided by law.itWring:~a. 
17 fminimilmtt:erm ·of&·confinement;.Lthe :offender shall not. be' eligible for p.ir'ole~:.:o-r 
18 \dis'charge or credit or re{hiction of sentence for goo·d conduct 'except for meri-
19 tOFi'ous service. The offender may be considered for parole or discharge at any 
20 time during the indeterminate period of the sentence. 
21 If the offense carries a mandatory minimum penalty as provided by statute, 
22 the court shall specify a minimum period of confinement consistent with such 
23 statute. If the offense is subject to an enhanced penalty as provided by 
24 statute, or if consecutive sentences are imposed for multiple offenses, the 
25 ~ourt shall, if required by statute, direct that the enhancement or each con-
26 secutive sentence contain a minimum-period of confinement; in such event, all 
27 minimum terms of confinement shall be served before any indeterminate periods 
28 commence to run. 
29 ~nactment of this amended section shall n~t affect the prosecution, adju-













19-2513A, Idaho Code, be, and the same l.S hereby 
20-223, Idaho Code, be, and the same l.S hereby 
36 20-223. PAROLE, RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING RESTRICTIONS 
37 PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION. (a) Subject to section 19-2513, 
38 Idaho Code, tzhe commission shall have the power to establish rules, regula-
39 tions, policies or procedures in compliance with chapter 52, title 67, Idaho 
40 Code, under which any prisoner; excepting any ur:der sentence of death, may be 
41 allowed to go upon parole but to ti-emain"whil~·<~i-1 parole in the legal custody>'' 
42 and under the control of the bo.{rd. 'and subject to be taken back into confine;:: 
























































(b) No person serving a sentence for rape, incest, committing a lewd act 
upon a child, crime against nature, or with an intent or an assault with 
intent to commit any of the said crimes or whose history and conduct indi·cate 
to the commission that he is a sexually dangerous person, shall be released on 
parole except upon the examination and evaluation of one or more psychiatrists 
or psychologists to be selected by the commission and sue~ evaluation shall be 
duly considered by the commission in making its parole determination. The 
commission may, in its discretion, likewise require a similar examination and 
evaluation for persons serving sentences for crimes other than those above 
enumerated. No psychiatrist or p~chologist making such evaluation shall be 
held financially responsible to any person for denial of parole by the commis-
sion or for the results of the fut~~e acts of such person if·he be granted 
parole. 
(c) Before considering the parole of any prisoner, the commission shall 
• • • • ~~~,..,~~"">"Sf.:?_-._ 
afford the pr1soner the. opportun1ty t~ be 1nterv1ewed •. A .parole~~~l'h~e· · 
ordered only for the best 1nterests of soc1ety when the comm1sS10n reasonably 
believes that the prisoner no longer poses a threat to the safety of society, 
not as a reward of clemency and it shall not be considered to be a reduction 
• ,'iW'f1""':=~: 
of sentence or a pardon.. A .pr1soner ~~~~!J, placed on parole only when 
arrangements have been made for J:ns employment· or maintenance and care, and 
when the commission believes the prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the 
obligations of a law-abiding citizen. The commission may also by its rules, 
,...,~"1-"'rions; policies or procedures fix the times and conditions under which 




(d) In making any parole or commutation decision with respect to 
one;,~ the commission shall consider the compliance of the prisoner 
ord.er ·of.: -r.~st itut ion which may have been entered according to section 
Idaho Coi:r€;. The commission may make compliance with such an order of restitu-
tion a condition of parole. 
.,_ 
~~SECTION~ 6~- Thi~-~-~ct ~hall be in full force and effect on and after Febru-
ary-,- "1 ,· 1987, and the amendments in this act shall apply only to those pers~ns 
'~Jio snalr·commi t an offense on or after February 1, 1987, and are not int.:nded 
to ·repeal or amend those provisions of the Code ~hich a?ply to per~cns ·::o:nmi t-
t1i:ig an offense prior to February 1, 1987, which provisions shall continue to 
apply, and further that amendments in this act are not intended to repeal or 
amend sections 19-2520, 19-252DA, 19-2520B, 19-2520C or 19-25200, Idaho Code. 
H524 
